Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

State of Utah v. Louis M. Clark : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Booker; Booker and Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Kent Morgan;
Deputy District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Clark, No. 950035 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6395

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No.

950035-CA

v.
Category No. 2

LOUIS M. CLARK
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL THE FROM THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES FOLLOWING CONVICTIONS FOR TWO
COUNTS OF FALSELY SIGNING A FINANCIAL
TRANSACTION CARD SALES SLIP, SECOND DEGREE
FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-6-506.1 (SUPP. 1991), IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, PRESIDING.

yAPPEALS

12,

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
KENT MORGAN
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

ROBERT L. BOOKER
BOOKER AND ASSOCIATES
Associated Plaza, Suite 550
349 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3044
Attorneys for Appellant

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
AND WRITTEN OPINION

r" i l~.
St? o 11995
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No.

950035-CA

v.
Category No. 2

LOUIS M. CLARK
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL THE FROM THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES FOLLOWING CONVICTIONS FOR TWO
COUNTS OF FALSELY SIGNING A FINANCIAL
TRANSACTION CARD SALES SLIP, SECOND DEGREE
FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-6-506.1 (SUPP. 1991), IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, PRESIDING.

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
KENT MORGAN
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

ROBERT L. BOOKER
BOOKER AND ASSOCIATES
Associated Plaza, Suite 550
34 9 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3044
Attorneys for Appellant

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
AND WRITTEN OPINION

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

'.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

12

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

B.

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL AND DISMISS THE
APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT ABANDONED HIS PRIOR
APPEAL, WHICH RAISED THE SAME ISSUE ADDRESSED
IN THIS APPEAL

14

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL AND DISMISS THE
APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEITHER OBJECTED TO
ONE OF THE COURT'S REASONS FOR DENYING HIS
MOTION, A CONCLUSION OF LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED
AN INDEPENDENT, ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION,
NOR DOES DEFENDANT CHALLENGE OR REFER TO THE
ORDER DENYING HIS MOTION, WHICH IS
PURPORTEDLY THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT'S APPEAL .

15

Failure to Object at Sentencing or Assign
Error on Appeal

15

Failure to Properly Brief Claim on Appeal

17

POINT III THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT
TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT
....

20

Introduction and Standard of Review

20

A.

i

B.

C.

The Trial Court Properly Considered
Defendant's Uncooperativeness with Law
Enforcement and Defendant's Rehabilitative
Needs, Notwithstanding the Assertion of
Fifth Amendment Rights

22

Defendant Failed to Properly Assert His Fifth
Amendment Rights

29

CONCLUSION

33

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION

33

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Docketing Statement of appeal in State v.
Clark, No. 930278-CA
Addendum B - Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Affirmance, Case No- 930278-CA
Addendum C - Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Correct Sentence.

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Am. Housing Corp. v. Richardson, 18 Utah 2d 197 417 P.2d
973 (1966)

15

Brav v. Cox. 342 N.E.2d 575 (N.Y. 1976)

14

Bundv v. Del and, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988)

20

First Am. Nat. Bank of Iuka v. Alcorn, Inc.. 361 So. 2d 481
(Miss. 1978)
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek. 684 P.2d 1257

14

(Utah 1984)

29

Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d 608 (Utah 1994)

15

H & S Ltd. v. Andreola. 363 N.W.2d 592 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) . . . 14
In re Crescenzi. 475 N.E.2d 453 (N.Y. 1985)

14

State v. Johnson. 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981)

19

Matter of Criminal Investigation. 7th Dist. Ct. No.. 754
P.2d 633 (Utah 1988)
Roberts v. United States. 445 U.S. 552, 100 S. Ct. 1358

29

(1980)

23, 24

State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Clark. No. 930278-CA

22
2

State v. Elm. 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991)

16

State v. Harrv. 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1994)

16

State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)

21

State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993)

2, 21

State v. Peterson. 881 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1994), cert.
denied. 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995)
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992)
iii

16
2, 18

State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991)

21

State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992)

16

State v. White. 671 P.2d 191 (Utah 1983)

29

State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819 (Utah 1989)

2, 16

State v. Wriaht. 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995)

21, 23

United States v. Araomaniz. 925 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1991)

. . . 30

United States v. Bradford. 645 F.2d 115 (2nd Cir. 1981) . . . 24, 29
United States v. Malekzadeh. 855 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert, denied. 489 U.S. 1029 (1989)
United States v. Manduiano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S. Ct. 1768
(1976)
United States v. Miller. 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978),
cert, denied. 440 U.S. 958 (1979)
United States v. Safirstein. 827 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir.
1987)

23
29
24, 25

25, 31, 32

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1995)

3, 22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1991)

1,

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1994)
U.S. Const. Amend. V

4
1

5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 22, 24

Utah Const. Art. I, § 12

5,

9, 10, 14, 21, 26, 28

Utah R. App. P. 3

19

Utah R. App. P. 4

19

Utah R. App. P. 24

3, 12, 17, 18, 19

Utah R. Crim. P. 22

3, 9, 11, 18, 19, 20

Utah R. Evid. 103

16

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No.

950035-CA

v.

:

LOUIS M. CLARK

: Category No. 2

De f endant-Appe11ant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the imposition of consecutive
sentences following convictions for two counts of falsely signing
a financial transaction card sales slip, second degree felonies,
in violat ion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1991), in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Is defendant's appeal barred following this Court's

dismissal of defendant's previous appeal of the same issue raised
in the present appeal?

This issue concerns the scope of this

Court's discretionary appellate power, consideration of which
does not involve a standard of review.
2.

Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's

claim when defendant has failed (1) to address an independent
ground upon which the trial court denied defendant's motion to
correct sentence, (2) to object in the trial court, and (3) to

properly reference the record and the decision purportedly
appealed from?

"As a general rule, a timely and specific

objection must be made in order to preserve an issue for appeal.
Absent a timely objection, [an appellate court] will review an
alleged error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it
constitutes "plain error."

State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-

21 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).

An appellate court will

decline to review the merits of a claim that has not been
adequately briefed under rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App.

1992) .
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing

defendant to consecutive sentences?

"A sentence will not be

overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or
imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits."
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah App. 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution - Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

2

Utah Code Ann. (1995)
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has
been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense,
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall
run concurrently unless the court states in the
sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.

(e) The court may correct an illegal
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of
the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:

(7) A statement of the case. The
statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review shall follow.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a
statement that no addendum is necessary under
this paragraph. . . . The addendum shall
contain a copy of:

3

(C) those parts of the record on
appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the
challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the
transcript of the court's oral decision, or
the contract or document subject to
construction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Louis M. Clark, was charged by information with
three counts of falsely signing a financial transaction card
sales slip, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1991) (R. 8-10).

At the preliminary

hearing count I was dismissed on the State's motion (R. 4 ) .
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted on both remaining
counts (R. 108-09).

After trial, but before the trial court

sentenced defendant, defendant appealed his conviction (R. 118).
This Court dismissed that appeal for defendant's failure to file
a docketing statement (R. 123).
Following sentencing, defendant was ordered to serve
consecutive terms of from one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison (R. 127-28).*

Defendant filed a new appeal (Case No.

930278-CA) (R. 131) , challenging the sentences on the ground that
the trial court had allegedly demanded his cooperation at
sentencing by requesting he give information that would reveal
additional criminal activities, in violation of his right to
1

The sentences which defendant challenges on appeal were
also to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed in a prior
conviction of falsely signing a financial card sales slip, i.e.,
case no. 921901310, tried in Third District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, Judge Timothy Hanson, presiding (R. 127-28,
374-75).
4

silence under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
or risk harsher punishment (see Docketing Statement, p. 2, and
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Affirmance in
Case No- 930278-CA, pp. 1-2, attached as Addendum A and B,
respectively).

Defendant's appeal was dismissed for failure to

file a brief (R. 421).
Six months later, defendant moved the trial court to correct
his sentences on the same grounds urged in his current appeal,
case no. 950035 (R. 428-42) . The trial court denied the motion
(R. 451-55), and it is from that ruling that defendant
purportedly appeals (R. 456).
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
Defendant was convicted of two counts of falsely signing a
financial transaction card sales slip (R. 127-28) through a
scheme involving the complicity of others in which credit cards
were intercepted between banks in the eastern United States and
Texas to be sold on the street (R. 388) . Specifically, defendant
was found guilty of the charged offenses by entering two Salt
Lake City banks, presenting stolen credit cards and falsified
driver's licences and signing two transaction card sales slips to
receive cash advancements in an amount totalling twenty-five
hundred dollars (PSR#2, p. 1-2).

2

A more detailed statement of the facts relating to the
substantive offense is not pertinent to the disposition of the
issue raised on appeal, and accordingly, they are omitted.
5

At the first of three sentencing hearings the trial court
indicated that it had the presentence report in Judge Hanson's
case and a brief update (R. 374).3

Defendant argued for

leniency in sentencing, stating that he had been erroneously
associated with the "Nigerian Mafia,ff4 and thereby unduly
sentenced to a harsh term by Judge Hanson (R. 375-78, 380-81). In
response, the prosecutor pointed out:

that defendant had given

the Adult Probation and Parole investigator the names of people,
neither of whom provided any useful information about defendant
(PSR#1, p. 7); that defendant acted evasively in explaining to
the investigator what happened in the offense; that because
information could not be obtained from defendant there was no way
to truly determine the existence of any prior criminal record;
and that defendant continued to act evasively by refusing to
provide any statement or background information that would assist
AP&P in determining an appropriate sentence (R. 379-80).
The trial court expressed its frustration, stating that

3

The presentence report in both the case tried before
Judge Hanson and this case are cited as "PSR#1" and "PSR#2,I!
respectively. Defendant's culpable conduct in the case tried
before Judge Hanson was substantially similar to his conduct in
this case. In that case defendant presented a stolen credit card
under the name Manuel Ramos with a false Virginia driver's
license under the same name to a teller of a First Security Bank
for a cash advance of thirty-five hundred dollars (PSR#1, p. 12) .
4

The record in this case contains an article and a report
describing the "Nigerian Mafia,lf a group allegedly organizing
credit card fraud in the United States (R. 12-13, 15-22). The
presentence report in Judge Hanson's case makes several
references to law enforcement's belief that defendant was
affiliated with this group (PSR#1, p. 3).
6

without any indication in the presentence report about the facts
surrounding this and other similar incidents, and the complexity
of these well thought-out credit card manipulations, it did not
know how to proceed (R. 385-86) . The court further noted that if
defendant refused to disclose how the crime was committed,
whether by himself or with conspirators, defendant would pay a
heavy penalty (R. 386-87, 391-92).

The trial court found that

the presentence reports lacked adequate explanations of how the
offense occurred, and that under the circumstances it was
defendant's duty to contact AP&P if he wanted to make further
disclosure at this point in the proceedings; otherwise, defendant
risked greater punishment (R. 388-90).

The court also stated

that defendant had nothing to lose by giving his relative's
names; even if they did not want to get involved, they should
speak to his good character (R. 393). On defendant's
representation that AP&P had made only an initial contact with
him, and in order to allow defendant the opportunity of making
further disclosure, the hearing was continued to February 22,
1993 (R. 391).
At the February 22 hearing, defendant informed the court
that AP&P had not contacted him (R. 395). The trial court
reiterated its sentencing concerns, and directed defendant to
speak with a detective, which would demonstrate his
cooperativeness in solving other crimes and demonstrate that
defendant did not have a attitude problem (evidenced by his
refusal to divulge any information to AP&P) which required
7

adjustment through more severe sentencing (R. 397-98).

The trial

court did indicate at this point that it was not so concerned
with the deficiencies in the presentence report (R. 3 98).

It

also indicated that if defendant cooperated, it would consider
concurrent sentences, but if he did not, then it would be
inclined to impose sentences consecutively (R. 399). At this
point defendant had not argued that his refusal to provide AP&P
with basic information about himself and the details of the
offense was based on a privilege against self-incrimination, and
the trial court's inclination to impose consecutive sentences was
based on defendant's refusal.

The hearing was again continued in

order to give defendant an opportunity to cooperate (R. 399).
On March 22, 1993, defendant informed the trial court that
he had not met with law enforcement to disclose other crimes in
which he might have been involved and the identity of coconspirators (R. 4 02-03).

He asserted that in the face of

potential federal prosecution on twenty other similar incidences
he had the right to refuse interviews with law enforcement under
the Fifth Amendment and the state constitution (R. 4 02-05) .
Therefore, he argued, it was improper for the trial court to
impose three consecutive sentences if he did not cooperate (R.
406-410).
The trial court stated that it did not intend defendant to
relinquish his right to remain silent and would not expect
defendant to incriminate himself absent a grant of immunity from
law enforcement agencies.

However, the court noted that its
8

observations were like those of Judge Hanson's:

there were

multiple transactions, the theft of a bundle of credit cards, the
use of false driver's licenses, all part of carefully thought-out
plan (R. 411). On these facts, plus the dearth of information
about defendant's background in the presentence report and
defendant's refusal to cooperate with law enforcement in
explaining this and other crimes, the court felt justified in
imposing consecutive indeterminate sentences of from one to
fifteen years, to be served consecutively with the same term for
a single count of the same offense imposed by Judge Hanson (R.
414-15).
Defendant originally appealed his sentences on the ground
that the trial court had demanded his cooperation at sentencing
by requesting he give information that would reveal additional
criminal activities, in violation of his right to silence under
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, or risk harsher
punishment (see Docketing Statement, p. 2, and Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Affirmance in Case No.
930278-CA, pp. 1-2). On April 5, 1994, this Court dismissed
defendant's appeal for failure to file a brief (R. 421).
Six months later, on October 12, 1994, pursuant to rule
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant filed a motion
to correct sentence, in which he again claimed that the trial
court had demanded his cooperation at sentencing*by requesting he
give information that would reveal additional criminal
9

activities, in violation of his right to silence under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, or risk harsher punishment
(R. 428-442).
At the hearing on his motion defendant summarized the events
of the three sentencing hearings (R. 460-465), emphasizing that
at one point in the proceedings the trial court was no longer
requesting that he supply background information for the
presentence report, but rather information concerning the overall
scheme without any protection in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights, all of which rendered the imposition of the harsher
consecutive sentences illegal (R. 463-67).
In rebuttal, the prosecution argued that the gravity of the
circumstances of the offenses justified the imposition of the
consecutive sentences:

that because defendant had evidently been

working with others whose identities remained undisclosed the
consecutive sentences served the trial court's concern that
defendant would return to criminal activity; that defendant had
refused to provide any information that would relate to his
rehabilitative needs or identify mitigating factors; that
defendant had an obligation to disclose the facts of his
offenses; and that conviction for the same offenses in Judge
Hanson's court constituted a substantial criminal history
meriting harsh punishment (R. 469-73).

Particularly, the

prosecution noted that defendant could have avoided any jeopardy

10

for federal prosecution, but that he refused to give any
information at all (R. 474).
In denying defendant's rule 22(e) motion, the court found
that in spite of defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment
privilege, which he only asserted at the third sentencing hearing
(R. 452), defendant had supplied no mitigating information
regarding his participation in the offenses or any documentation
necessary for a complete background check, and that AP&P had
recommended consecutive terms (R. 479, 453; PSR#2, p.4) (Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion
to Correct Sentence, hereinafter "Ruling," R. 451-55, attached as
Addendum C).

The court concluded that a defendant's refusal to

cooperate could be considered as evidence of defendant's
expectation to return to criminal activity; that although
defendant had a right to assert his Fifth Amendment rights, that
assertion did not give him the right to stand mute5 regarding
non-inculpatory matters; and that the court did not have a basis
to impose anything less than consecutive sentences when the only
information before it was defendant's "highly culpable
participation in a crime of substantial gravity" (R. 453). The
court also concluded that since defendant had failed to prosecute
his earlier appeal, he had waived all rights to any remedy that
could have resulted from that appeal (R. 480-81; Ruling, R. 453).

5

The findings incorrectly use the word "moot" (R. 453).
However, the trial court's intention, in view of defendant's
refusal to speak to any investigator about any aspect of the
case, is clear.
11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim
because defendant abandoned an appeal by failing to file an
appellant's brief on precisely the same issue raised in this
appeal.

Thereafter, this Court dismissed that earlier appeal,

which, under the circumstances of this case, should act as a bar
to the presentation of a subsequent appeal on the same issue.
POINT II
The Court should also refuse to consider defendant's claim
because he failed to object to an independent ground supporting
the trial court's ruling denying his motion to correct sentence,
i.e., that defendant waived his rights to remedies sought upon
his motion because he had failed to prosecute his earlier appeal.
Moreover, defendant has not even challenged the substance of that
ruling on appeal. Additionally, defendant has failed not only to
cite to the relevant record in challenging the trial court's
ruling, but has also failed to include the very ruling which he
purports to challenge and which is purportedly the basis of the
present appeal in his brief, either through record reference or
attachment in an addendum, as required by rule 24, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

These procedural omissions suggest that

defendant wishes this Court to overlook the ruling, which is the
actual subject of his current appeal, because it is adverse to

12

him and explicitly notes his failure to pursue his earlier appeal
as an independent ground for denying his motion.
POINT III
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment.

The trial court

pressed defendant to cooperate with law enforcement in disclosing
the facts of the credit card fraud and other related crimes or
risk being sentenced to consecutive sentences.

The trial court

was, however, very concerned that defendant persisted in refusing
to disclose any information whatsoever to Adult Probation and
Parole about his background or the facts of his participation a
complex and sophisticated credit card fraud.

As a result of

defendant's refusal to provide any information, the court had
absolutely no mititigating information on which to base a more
lenient sentence or to consider defendant anything but a poor
risk for rehabilitation.
The trial court properly recognized that defendant was
entitled to assert his privilege to remain silent, but that
exercise of the privilege did not give defendant the right to
refuse blanketly to answer non-inculpatory questions.

Defendant

never established that his fear of federal prosecution was
sufficient to make lawful his refusal to anwer questions which
had never actually been put to him, entirely apart from refusing
any questions whatsoever.

Further, it is disputed on the record

whether defendant did not receive an authorization of immunity
because of his general refusal to cooperate.
13

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL AND DISMISS THE
APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT ABANDONED HIS PRIOR
APPEAL, WHICH RAISED THE SAME ISSUE ADDRESSED
IN THIS APPEAL
Defendant's second appeal challenged the imposition of
consecutive sentences on the ground that the trial court had
demanded his cooperation at sentencing by requesting he give
information that would reveal additional criminal activities, in
violation of his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution, or risk harsher punishment (see Docketing
Statement, p. 2. and Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Affirmance in Case No. 930278-CA, pp. 1-2). Defendant
raises exclusively and precisely the same issue in this appeal.
This Court dismissed defendant's earlier appeal for failure to
file an appellant's brief (R. 421).
The general rule is that a prior dismissal of an appeal for
want of prosecution acts as a bar to a subsequent appeal as to
all questions that were presented on the earlier appeal.

Bray v.

Cox, 342 N.E.2d 575, 576-77 (N.Y. 1976) (per curiam); In re
Crescenzi, 475 N.E.2d 453, 454 (N.Y. 1985); H & S Ltd. v.
Andreola, 363 N.W.2d 592, 593-95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); First Am.
Nat. Bank of Iuka v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So.2d 481, 493 (Miss.
1978).
14

Because defendant abandoned and acquiesced in the dismissal
of his earlier appeal, this Court should find that defendant is
barred from raising the same issues in a successive appeal. Am.
Housing Corp. v. Richardson, 18 Utah 2d 197, 198-99, 417 P.2d
973, 974 (1966) (refusing to consider issues raised by
intervenors in a appeal dismissed following stipulation on the
issues by the principal parties, an appeal thus considered "dead"
by the supreme court); cf. Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 616
(Utah 1994) (refusing to consider in the defendant's appeal from
a denial of a petition for post-conviction relief essentially the
same claim that had earlier been made on direct appeal, i.e.,
alleged error not to hold bifurcated hearing).

Because the issue

defendant has raised in this appeal is barred, this Court should
decline to consider the issue and dismiss the appeal.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL AND DISMISS THE
APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEITHER OBJECTED TO
ONE OF THE COURT'S REASONS FOR DENYING HIS
MOTION, A CONCLUSION OF LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED
AN INDEPENDENT, ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION,
NOR DOES DEFENDANT CHALLENGE OR REFER TO THE
ORDER DENYING HIS MOTION, WHICH IS
PURPORTEDLY THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT'S APPEAL
A.

Failure to Object at Sentencing
or Assign Error on Appeal

"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection must be
made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Absent a timely
objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged error only
if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes "plain
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error."

State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989)

(citations omitted).
The waiver rule applies in sentencing proceedings as well as
at trial.

See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991)

(refusing to consider the merits of the defendant's claims
because the defendant "failed to make specific objections to any
of these alleged defects at the sentencing hearing, as required
by Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a), and therefore, he has waived his
right to raise these issues at this time").

Moreover, an

appellate court will not consider an issue for the first time on
appeal when the defendant did not argue plain error.

State v.

Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing to
consider an arguably meritorious claim where plain error was not
argued on appeal); State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah
App. 1994) (refusing to disturb the sentencing where defendant
failed to object or argue plain error in a reply brief), cert.
denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995).6
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court addressed the
merits of defendant's arguments (R. 478-80; Ruling, R. 451-53).
However, as an independent ground for denying the motion, the
trial court ruled that since defendant had failed to prosecute
his earlier appeal, he had waived all rights to any remedy that
6

Generally, an argument made for the first time in a reply
brief will not be considered by the reviewing court. State v.
Harrv, 873 P.2d 1149, (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Brown,
853 P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992)). This case is entirely unlike
Peterson, where the defendant had at least addressed the
substance of her claim in her opening brief, thereby giving the
State an opportunity to respond. (See discussion below.)
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could have resulted from that appeal (R. 480-81; Ruling, R. 453).
Defendant did not challenge the trial court's independent reason
at the sentencing (R. 481); nor does he assign error or even
refer to it on appeal.

Because defendant does not claim that the

trial court erred in finding that he had waived his rights
concerning his sentencing for failure to prosecute his appeal,
that ruling, as an independent ground for denying defendant's
motion, should remain undisturbed, and this Court should decline
to address the merits of the defendant's claim in this appeal.
B.

Failure to Properly Brief Claim on Appeal

Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of
the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:

(7) A statement of the case. The
statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review shall follow.

(11) An addendum to the brief or a
statement that no addendum is necessary under
this paragraph. . . . The addendum shall
contain a copy of:

(C) those parts of the record on
appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as . . . .
the . . . . findings of fact and conclusions
of law, [or] the transcript of the court's
oral decision . . . .
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(e) References in briefs to the record.
References shall be made to the pages of the
original record . . . .
Utah R. App. P. 24 (emphasis added).
In State v. Price, the defendant failed to correlate the
issues with the substance of the brief, omitted references to the
course of proceedings and disposition of the trial court, and
failed to cite to the record with respect to relevant facts or
provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis.
Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248-250 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

This Court noted

these shortcomings under rule 24, and, accordingly, refused to
address the merits of defendant's claim on appeal.

Id. at 24 9-

50.
This appeal is purportedly an attack on the trial court's
denial of defendant's rule 22(e) motion.

Appellant's Br. at 1.

Defendant's brief, however, entirely fails to identify the ruling
from which the appeal is taken, referencing instead the
sentencing from which he took an earlier appeal which was
subsequently dismissed.

All page references in defendant's brief

are to the original sentencing instead of to either the hearing
or written ruling putatively challenged in this appeal. As a
result, not only is there no challenge to an independent basis
for the court's denial of the motion (discussed above), there is
not even an effective challenge to the trial court's rule 22(e)
ruling in this case.
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In failing to make the obvious and necessary references to
the only ruling which from which defendant appeals, defendant has
not made an ingenuous mistake, but rather deliberately attempted
to make an end-run around this Court's dismissal of defendant's
earlier appeal and the jurisdictional rules.
It is apparent that following the dismissal of the earlier
appeal, the filing of another notice of appeal six months later
from the same trial court ruling would be untimely under rule
4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.7

Only by the expedient

of claiming an illegal sentence under rule 22 (e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, has defendant been able to resurrect a
challenge to his sentence.

However, defendant's appeal on the

precise issue of the legality of his sentence has already been
dismissed by this Court for failure to file a brief.

Moreover,

as the discussion above illustrates, this appeal is, by all its
record references and discussion, really just another attempt to

7

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order.
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as
a matter of right from the trial court to the
appellate court, the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from,
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). In Johnson, the defendant also failed to
timely file a notice of appeal. The 30-day period for filing a
notice of appeal in a criminal case is jurisdictional and cannot
be enlarged by an appellate court. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d
36, 37 (Utah 1981). Therefore, "[o]ut-of-time appeals must be
dismissed." Id.
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appeal the original sentencing order, rather than to genuinely
appeal from the trial court's ruling denying defendant's rule
22(e) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

If this Court were

to allow a defendant to perennially attack his sentence under
rule 22(e) where the basis of the challenge had already been the
subject of a dismissed appeal, there would be no end to the
possible number of appeals a defendant could legitimately file.
Therefore, on the facts of this case, it would be improper
to consider the merits of defendant's challenge, and this appeal
should be dismissed.8

While the State feels confident that,

based on the foregoing argument, this Court should not consider
the merits of defendant's argument, the State has, nonetheless,
addressed defendant's claim.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SENTENCED DEPENDANT
TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT
A.

Introduction and Standard of Review

"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the
trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds
8

Defendant's proper recourse lies not in pursuing this
appeal, but in post-conviction proceedings under rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, wherein he may allege the
ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to prosecute the prior
appeal (Case No. 930278-CA), wherein the issue in this appeal was
first presented and abandoned. See Bundv v. Deland, 763 P.2d
803, 805 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that " [i] f counsel's
deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive plaintiff of
the effective assistance of counsel, they constitute a violation
of due process that is clearly reviewable by habeas corpus
review"). It would appear that the present appeal is an effort
to avoid just such an undertaking.
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legally prescribed limits."
(Utah App. 1993).

State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 457

"[B]efore the reviewing court may overturn the

sentence given by the trial court[,] 'it must be clear that the
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute
an abuse of discretion.'"

State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051

(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utah 1978) (emphasis in original).

,f/

[T]he exercise of

discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal
judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would
take the view adopted by the trial court.'"

State v. Wright, 893

P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887).
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences because he
refused, to cooperate with law enforcement in providing
information about the offenses, which, without immunity,
allegedly would have compelled him to unlawfully waive his right
to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.9

Appellant's Br. at 9-10. The claim, however,

9

Defendant's claim under article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution does not warrant special attention. Defendant
relies only on cases applying the Fifth Amendment and does not
suggest that any different analysis should be applied under the
Utah Constitution. Therefore, the Court need consider the merits
of defendant's claim under the federal constitution only. State
v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.2 (Utah App.) ("Defendant has
failed to provide a separate analysis under the Utah
Constitution. We therefore consider his right to counsel claim
under the United States Constitution only," citing State v.
Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), cert, denied.
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fails to take into account that by refusing to provide any
information whatsoever about himself or the serious, multiple
offenses of which he was convicted, the trial court had no other
reasonable recourse under the sentencing statute but to sentence
defendant consecutively.

Additionally, under the circumstances

of this case, defendant failed to satisfy his burden to show that
(1) he had a genuine apprehension of additional prosecution for
federal offenses if he cooperated with law enforcement and (2)
that he could not have provided some useful information to law
enforcement or AP&P that would have provided a basis for
mitigating his sentence without compelling him to waive his Fifth
Amendment rights, all of which remained concerns of the trial
court notwithstanding its request for his cooperation.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Considered
Defendant's Uncooperativeness with Law
Enforcement and Defendant's Rehabilitative
Needs, Notwithstanding the Assertion of
Fifth Amendment Rights

1.

The Law

The statute governing the imposition of consecutive or
concurrent sentences provides:

"A court shall consider the

gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences."

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (1995).

504 U.S. 911, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992)), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App.
1990)).
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In imposing a sentence that appropriately recognizes a
defendant's rehabilitative needs, the trial court necessarily
considers the degree to which a defendant is willing to cooperate
with law enforcement by disclosing his knowledge of crime:
This deeply rooted social obligation is
not diminished when the witness to crime is
involved in illicit activity himself. Unless
his silence is protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination . . . the criminal
defendant no less than the ordinary citizen
is obliged to assist the authorities. The
petitioner, for example, was asked to expose
the purveyors of heroin in his own community
in exchange for a favorable disposition of
his case. By declining to cooperate,
petitioner rejected an "obligatio[n] of
community life" that should be recognized
before rehabilitation can begin. . . .
Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate
protected his former partners in crime,
thereby preserving his ability to resume
criminal activities upon release. Few facts
available to a sentencing judge are more
relevant to lf,the likelihood that [a
defendant] will transgress no more, the hope
that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts
to assist with a lawful future career, [and]
the degree to which he does or not deem
himself at war with his society.'"
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558, 100 S. Ct. 1358,
1363 (1980) (citations omitted).

See State v. Wright, 893 P.2d

at 1120-22 (sentence of middle severity properly imposed for lack
of cooperation where defendant denied his acts before trial and
actually asserted that minor child had initiated sexual contact);
United States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1988)
(applying Roberts, most severe sentence properly imposed for
failure to cooperate, notwithstanding a claim of penalization for
exercise of right to remain silent), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1029
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(1989); United States v. Bradford, 645 F.2d 115, 117 (2nd Cir.
1981) (same).
The key question is whether, under the facts of the given
case, the court imposed the more severe sentences because the
defendant refused to cooperate with law enforcement after
properly exercising his Fifth Amendment right, or because the
court was genuinely concerned with the defendant's rehabilitative
needs.
2.

In Sentencing Defendant, the Trial
Court was Reasonably Concerned with
Defendant's Refusal to Cooperate bv
Providing Any Useful Information

In United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978),
cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979), a pre-Roberts case, the
district court imposed the maximum sentences on a defendant who
refused to recant his claim of innocence and to cooperate for
fear of losing his right of appeal through waiver of his right to
silence.

Id. at 1137-38.

In considering the appropriate

sentence, the district court noted that it had considered the
presentence report, that defendant was "simply the tip of the
iceberg", that "the defendant has consistently declined to cooperate in any way with the prosecuting and investigating
officials in their efforts to bring into Court all of those who
are involved in this very substantial operation," and that it was
aware that the defendant was in no way obligated to incriminate
himself.

Id. at 1137-38 n. 18. The Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit, recognizing the distinction between punishing a
defendant for maintaining his innocence and considering a
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defendant's failure to recant when evaluating his prospects for
rehabilitation, found the district court's focus to have been on
the latter and held the imposition of the greater sentence
proper.

Id. at 1138-39.

The State does not dispute that if a trial court sentenced a
defendant to a harsher sentence only on account of his
legitimately asserting his Fifth Amendment right, the sentence
would be unlawful.

United States v. Safirstein, 827 F.2d 1389,

1388-39 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Roberts, 445 U.S. at 55960, 100 S. Ct. at 1363-64, wherein the defendant did not
intelligibly assert his right to silence at sentencing).
However, this is not the case here.

Instead, while the trial

court informed defendant that if he cooperated with the
prosecutor's investigator by disclosing information about the
offenses for which defendant was convicted, as well as other
crimes suggested by the evidence, that it would be inclined to
impose concurrent rather than consecutive terms of imprisonment
(R. 397-402), it was largely concerned with defendant's failure
to make any disclosure about himself at all that would have aided
it in assessing a proper sentence under the sentencing statute, a
concern which it expressed at every sentencing hearing (Hearing
of 1/4/93, R. 383-83, 385, 88-89, 391-93/ Hearing of 2/22/93,- R.
398; Hearing of 3/22/93, R. 402, 414),
The trial court recognized that defendant's disinclination
to cooperate with law enforcement represented an attitude problem
for which more severe sentencing was appropriate (R. 398). It
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further recognized that without supplying the most minimal
information to AP&P, both in the instant case and in that tried
before Judge Hanson, the court had little guidance (R. 385), and
that defendant had failed to make open and adequate disclosure
which would have indicated something of defendant's honesty (R.
390) .10 The court informed defendant that he had nothing to
lose by at least giving AP&P the names of his relatives, who,
even if they did not want to become involved, could speak to his
good character (R. 392), but defendant did not make even this
modest concession.
Most importantly, even after pressing defendant for his
cooperation in disclosing the particulars of this and other

10

Both presentence reports reflect defendant's total
failure to supply AP&P with any information about himself or the
crimes he was convicted of. In the case tried before Judge
Hanson: defendant declined to provide AP&P with a statement
about the offense (PSR#1, p. 3, par. B ) ; the prosecution did not
have sufficient information to verify information defendant gave
about his name and date of birth (PSR#1, p. 4, par. I); defendant
could not provide the AP&P investigator information about
educational institutions which he had attended, nor the accurate
locations of his mother and cousins from whom he purportedly
received some support, and defendant would not disclose any
information about a Mr. Paul Smith, who allegedly supplied the
money to retain counsel in this case (PSR#1, p. 5, par. C ) ;
collateral contacts could provide no information about defendant
(PSR#1, p. 7); and, defendant was evasive in giving information
about collateral contacts, the Secret Service had been contacted
and were unable to very defendant's birth in the Virgin Islands
or any other information and that defendant had refused to
provide any information that would assist in verifying his place
of birth (PSR#1, p. 8).
The brief presentence report in this case, also shows that
defendant was "very evasive" in disclosing the names of family
members or associates, allegedly because they would be harassed
by agents of the criminal justice system (PSR#2, p. 3). Indeed,
at the third sentencing hearing, defense counsel acknowledged
that defendant had been uncooperative (R. 407).
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similar offenses, the trial court, at the third sentencing
hearing, continued to express its concern that defendant had been
convicted of multiple offenses involving a complex crime about
which defendant refused to cooperate in explaining and that the
presentence report disclosed little background information,
leaving the court without information about possible other
criminal behavior (Hearing of 3/22/93, R. 414). In denying
defendant's motion, the court again noted that the presentence
report gave little useful familial history which precluded AP&P
from making collateral contacts that would result in useful
information (R. 479). The court also noted that it had
recognized defendant's right to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege (R. 480).
The court's written ruling reflected these perceptions:
Only at the third sentencing hearing had defendant invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege out of fear of federal prosecution; the
court had assured defendant that he could assert his right to
remain silent, but that defendant had been involved in a highly
sophisticated criminal enterprise, "and that because no
information had been presented to the Court to mitigate against
the known gravity of the crime, the equities weighed in favor of
the imposition of a lengthy prison sentence" (Ruling, par. 3, R.
452). [Emphasis added.]

The court further noted that " [a]t no

time has the defendant come forward with documentation indicating
his name, date of birth or other information necessary to conduct
the thorough background investigation and criminal history check
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routinely relied upon by the Court in determining sentence"
(Ruling, par. 4, R. 452-53).
In concluding, the trial court stated:
1. A sentencing court may appropriately
consider a defendant's refusal to cooperate
with law enforcement investigation of
criminal activities known to the defendant as
evidence of his expectation to return to
criminal activities, thus warranting a
lengthier sentence, unless the defendant
righteously asserts a constitutional right; a
defendant's right guaranteed by the 5th
Amendment protects the defendant from being
compelled to give testimony against himself,
but does not provide him a blanket privilege
to stand moot fsicl regarding non-inculpatory
matters and demand that the sentencing court
assume his good character.
2. A sentencing court must weigh the gravity
of the crime against the defendant's
background, history and rehabilitative needs
toward determining whether to impose
consecutive or concurrent sentences; when the
only information available to a sentencing
court demonstrates the defendant's highly
culpable participation in a crime of
substantial gravity, it is not inappropriate
to impose consecutive sentences. [Emphasis
added.]
(Ruling, R. 453).
This record shows that the trial court properly applied
section 76-3-401 and the policy requiring culpable defendants to
cooperate with law enforcement, and that its actions in
sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences, a decision
recommended by the AP&P investigator (PSR#2, p. 4 ) , were not so
inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion,
notwithstanding defendant's assertion of Fifth Amendment rights.

28

C.

Defendant Failed to Properly Assert
His Fifth Amendment Rights

The trial court correctly observed that defendant's
assertion of his constitutional right to remain silent did not
provide him with a blanket privilege to remain mute as to noninculpatory matters (R. 453). First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Utah 1984) ("[The privilege
against self-incrimination] may not generally be asserted as a
blanket response to all discovery."); Matter of Criminal
Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct. No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 646-47 (Utah
1988) (in a grand jury proceeding the privilege extends only to
specific incriminating questions); State v. White, 671 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1983) (the Fifth Amendment privilege comes into play
only with respect to specific questions and cannot be claimed in
advance of the questions being asked).
If a grand jury witness invokes the Fifth Amendment, then
the grand jury can seek a judicial determination as to the bona
fides of the witness's Fifth Amendment claim, "in which case the
witness must satisfy the court that the claim of privilege is not
a subterfuge."

United States v. Manduiano, 425 U.S. 564, 575, 96

S. Ct. 1768, 1776 (1976).

The burden is on the defendant to show

that his fear of incrimination is genuine.
118.

Bradford. 645 F.2d at

If the assertion of the privilege is found reasonable, then

the prosecution must consider an offer of immunity if the
witness's testimony is to be compelled.

Manduiano, 425 U.S. at

575, 96 S. Ct. at 1776 ("Immunity displaces the danger.")
(citations omitted).
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In this case defendant never gave law enforcement the
opportunity to ask him any questions to which he might have
invoked his privilege to remain silent, if appropriate.

At the

beginning of both the second and third sentencing hearings,
continued for the very purpose of providing defendant the
opportunity to disclose information to law enforcement, defendant
acknowledged that he had not contacted AP&P (R. 394-95; R. 40203).

Moreover, defendant only mentioned at the third sentencing

hearing that his concern about imminent federal prosecution for
similar offenses compelled him to assert his privilege (Hearing
of 3/22/93, R. 405-06; hearing on motion, R. 476-77).

However,

defendant never offered any proof that his concerns were
reasonably founded, and the trial court never made a finding to
that effect.

See United States v. Araomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1356

(11th Cir. 1991) (remanding back to the district court to
determine the existence of the Fifth Amendment privilege where
the defendant had asserted a blanket claim).

Moreover, at the

hearing on his motion, the prosecutor argued that defendant could
have provided the trial court with much information while still
avoiding any jeopardy posed by possible federal prosecution (R.
474), an argument defendant never rebutted.

In fact, defendant

never established that he actually was being investigated by
federal authorities.
Finally, defendant's claim that he could not cooperate where
no immunity was offered is uncertain.

Defendant'only first

asserted that he had not been offered immunity at the hearing on
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his rule 22(e) motion (R. 464-65), although the trial court noted
at the third sentencing hearing that it would not expect
defendant to incriminate himself by cooperating with law
enforcement without an authorization of immunity (R. 410-11).
However, at the hearing on the motion defendant did not rebut the
prosecution's claim that "defendant showed no interest in
cooperating even with a grant of immunity" (Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence, R. 447).
In any event, the Salt Lake County Prosecutor's Office was hardly
in a position to offer defendant immunity for federal
prosecution, and there is no evidence that defendant took any
steps to properly obtain an offer of immunity.
It is defendant's total failure to disclose any information
about himself and the circumstances of the offenses, coupled with
defendant's belated assertion of his privilege to remain silent
and the reasonable disposition of the trial court, that
dramatically distinguishes Safirstein, the case which defendant
primarily relies on, from this case.
In Safirstein, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the imposition of consecutive, maximum sentences for the
defendant's refusal to disclose the details of the offense "where
it was evident from outset that Safirstein sought, by his
refusal, to assert his privilege.

In such circumstances, the

refusal to cooperate does not necessarily reflect adversely upon
a defendant's prospect's for rehabilitation."
F.2d at 1389.
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Safirstein, 827

In this case defendant did not assert the Fifth Amendment
until the third sentencing hearing, the tardiness of which the
trial court obviously took, in part, to be an ad hoc rationale
for defendant's on-going refusal to cooperate (see Ruling, par. 2
& 3, R. 452). Also, the court in Safirstein, had the benefit of
a presentence report which, at the very least, disclosed the
defendant's educational, familial and professional history.
Safirstein, 827 F.2d at 1387.

In this case defendant refused at

every juncture to provide the trial court with any information.
The trial courts' radically different attitudes to the
respective defendants in Safirstein and in this case are also
important distinguishing factors.

In Safirstein, the defendant

was convicted of wilfully making a false statement and willful
failure to report the attempted transportation of more than
$10,000 in monetary instruments outside the United States.
Safirstein, 827 F.2d at 1382-83.

In holding that the district

court had abused its discretion in imposing the sentences, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that not only had the
district court sentenced defendant more harshly for failing to
cooperate with law enforcement, but that it also had relied on
unreasonable inferences about the defendant's complicity in an
international drug trafficking, for which there was not a
scintilla of evidence, and had dramatically departed from the
presentence report's recommendations.

It is impossible to escape

the conclusion that the court of appeals was judiciously
describing a vindictive and unreasonable sentencing procedure.
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The attitude of the trial court in this case was altogether
different.

The record shows that the trial court acted

judiciously throughout the proceedings, making only a reasonable
demand upon defendant that he supply the trial court with some
information that would assist it in sentencing him.

Defendant,

on the other hand, suggested at several points in the sentencing
proceedings that the trial court had been improperly influenced
by racially motivated suggestions from local newspapers that
defendant belonged to a shadowy organization known as the
"Nigerian Mafia" (R. 375-76, 407-08).

However, the trial court

noted that it was defendant who had injected the "Nigerian Mafia"
into the proceedings (R. 411), and that the court had never
considered the matter in sentencing (R. 386-87, 411) . In sum,
the court fairly considered defendant's total failure to supply
any information, including personal background or that which
might have been useful to AP&P and law enforcement in elucidating
this and other offenses, as evidence of his poor prospects for
rehabilitation, and sentenced defendant accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that the trial court's rule 22(e) ruling and defendant's
sentences be affirmed.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
Both issues presented in this case, i.e., the circumvention
of appellate rules governing timely filed appeals and the
propriety of imposing consecutive sentences when defendant has
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totally failed to supply information, notwithstanding defendant's
claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment, warrant oral
argument and a written published opinion to further develop Utah
law in these areas.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of September, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

/KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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November 17 and 13/ 1992. Additional facts are not presently known
to his counsel who was not his counsel during trial.

Such facts

will be disclosed by the transcript. At sentencinq the lower court
advised

the

defendant

+hat

if

he made a

statement

to law

enforcement officials about all of his alleged criminal activities,
the

Court

might

sentences.

be

favorably

inclined

to - enter

concurrent

The defendant declined to make such a statement. - The

Court sentenced him to consecutive sentences.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

whether the

lower

court

erred

or

abused

its

discretion in sentencing the defendant to consecutive sentences.
2.

Such other issues as may appear from the transcript

of the trial.

PPTEFMIPATIVE MJTPO*mE$
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah.

Fifth ^^^^o^^i^^^^^^B^^^^^l^^nltBd
Constitution.
Utah Code -Ann1; fS76V3-*0~l..:;

States

ttTOIPP CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Docketing Statement was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, on the

1^

day of July, 1993 •

ADDENDUM B

EDWARD K. BRASS (#432)
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 6th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
Telephone: (801) 322-5678
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

vs.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE
Case No. 930278-CA

LOUIS M. CLARK,
Defendant/Appellant.
Defendant, by and through his attorney, Edward K. Brass,
hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Affirmance.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
After a two day jury trial, held on November 17 and 18,
1992, the appellant was convicted on two counts of Falsely
Making, Coding or signing a Financial Transaction Card in
violation of Utah
1.

Code Ann. Section 76-6-506.1 (1990).

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court advised

appellant that if he made a statement to law enforcement
officials about all of his alleged criminal activities, the court
might be favorably inclined to enter concurrent rather than
consecutive sentences.
2.

When the appellant declined to make such a statement,

the court sentenced him to consecutive sentences.

3,

Present counsel did not represent appellant at trial,

therefore, the facts of as disclosed at trial are presently
unknown to him,
4.

Present counsel is unable to adequately identify

additional issues which are appropriately included in this appeal
until he has the opportunity to review the trial transcripts.

ARGUMENT
Appellee's Memorandum in Support of Summary Affirmance,
alleges appellant's docketing statement fails to provide detail
as to the basis for this claim of error and that the issue
appellant identified fails to present a substantial issue for
review.

However, appellants docketing statement complies with

Rule 10 U.R.A.P.(c)(5) which says a docketing statement is to
clearly express the terms and circumstances of the case without
unnecessary detail.1
asks:

The docketing statement in its entirety

Whether it is abuse of discretion for the trial court to

condition defendant's sentence on a waiver of his constitutional
«i

right to "noi be compelled to give evidence against himself"
•i

under Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States' Constitution.
Although the court is charged by statute to -consider the
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
1

U.R.A.P* Rule 10 (c)(5) states in pertinent part: "The
issues presented by the appeal, [should be] expressed in the
terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary
detail."

2

character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant,"

Utah Code

Ann- Section 76-3-401(2)(1990), this statute does not direct the
court to threaten the defendant with a harsher sentence if he
invokes his right to remain silent rather than provide
information to the court.
Whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion when
it gave the defendant an ultimatum to provide information or risk
a harsher sentence clearly presents a substantial issue for
review.
With regard to potential issues that may appear upon
present counsel's review of the trial transcript, although
appellee addresses this issue in a footnote, the fact is, without
the opportunity to review the trial transcripts present counsel
cannot adequately brief issues that may be appropriate for
appeal.

Present counsel did not represent appellant at trial,

therefore, the facts as disclosed at trial are presently unknown
to him and there may very well be additional issues that should
be included in this appeal. Indeed, the defendant and other
observers ha^e alluded to the possibility of other such issues.
However, present counsel believes that to assert such issues in a
docketing statement without support from a written record would
be tantamount to bad faith.

For example, the defendant and

others have alleged he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. His claim is supported to some extent by former
counsel's filing of a notice of appeal in this action months
before he defendant was sentenced.
3

In fact, he then took no

other action to pursue the improperly filed appeal and this Court
dismissed it, all still before the lower court proceeding had
concluded.

However, present counsel is reluctant to make such a

damaging allegation without support from a written record.
Rule 10(f) U.R.A.P allows the court to defer its ruling as
to any issue raised by a motion for summary disposition, until
plenary presentation and consideration of the case.

Because,

present counsel was not trial counsel and it is probable that
issues will present themselves upon review of the trial
transcript it is appropriate for the court to defer any
unfavorable ruling it may entertain until counsel has the
opportunity to adequately brief all issues that may present
themselves in this matter.
CONCLUSION
For each or any of the foregoing reasons, the appellee's
motion for summary affirmance should be denied or in the
alternative deferred.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

/7

day of August, 1 M 3 .

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Defendant

ADDENDUM C

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
BARBARA J. BYRNE, Bar No. 3920
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

FILED DISTRICT C0UHT
Third Judicial District

DEC 1 6 1994
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
I
])
>
|

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
CORRECT SENTENCE

]i

Case No. 921901498

]
I

Hon. KENNETH RIGTRUP

v.
LOUIS M. CLARK,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence having come before this Court for
hearing in the above entitled matter on November 7,1994, and the Court having fully considered
the pleadings and other documents filed in this case, having considered the arguments of counsel,
having presided over the trial and otherwise being fully advised in the matter before it, this Court
now enters its FINDINGS of FACT, CONCLUSIONS of LAW and ORDER:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On March 22,1993, the defendant, Louis M. Clark, was sentenced to consecutive
terms of 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison based on his convictions by jury of two counts of
Falsely Signing a Financial Transaction Card Receipt, each a Second Degree Felony.

2. On January 4 and February 22,1993, sentencing hearings were continued in order to
allow the defendant an opportunity to provide the State and the Court information needed to aid
in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed; through representations by counsel at each
of these hearings the defendant expressed a willingness to provide additional information if
allowed the opportunity; the defendant did not express any intention to exercise hisrightto
remain silent.

3. At the March 22 hearing, for the first time, the defendant expressed through counsel
his interest in asserting a 5th Amendment privilege toward refusing to provide information that
may have exposed him to jeopardy of prosecution by the federal government for conduct related
to the crimes for which he had been convicted in Utah, and the defendant argued that earlier
directions that he should cooperate with law enforcement placed him in an unfair predicament.
The Court responded by reassuring the defendant that he did have therightto remain silent, but
apprised the defendant that the information available to the Court indicated his highly culpable
participation in a sophisticated criminal enterprise-involving credit cards stolen in Texas and
forged identification from Virginia used at banks in Utah, and that because no information had
been presented to the Court to mitigate against the known gravity of the crime, the equities
weighed in favor of the imposition of a lengthy prison sentence.

4. At no time has the defendant come forward with documentation indicating his name,
date of birth, place of birth or other information necessary to conduct the thorough background

00452
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investigation and criminal history check routinely relied upon by the Court in determining
sentence.

5. The recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole and the State of Utah was that the
defendant be committed to consecutive terms of incarceration at the Utah State Prison.

6. Although a notice of appeal was filed on behalf of the defendant, no direct appeal on
the merits of the defendant's convictions was prosecuted.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. A sentencing court may appropriately consider a defendant's refusal to cooperate with
law enforcement investigation of criminal activities known to the defendant as evidence of his
expectation to return to criminal activities, thus warranting a lengthier sentence, unless the
defendant righteously asserts a constitute. ~alright;a defendant'srightguaranteed by the 5th
Amendment protects the defendant from being compelled to give testimony against himself, but
does not provide him a blanket privilege to stand moot regarding non-inculpatory matters and
demand that the sentencing court assume his good character.

2. A sentencing court must weigh the gravity of the crime against the defendant's
background, history and rehabilitative needs toward determining whether to impose consecutive
or concurrent sentences; when the only information available to a sentencing court demonstrates
the defendant's highly culpable participation in a crime of substantial gravity, it is not
inappropriate to impose consecutive sentences.

3. A defendant who fails to timely prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction waives
all claim to any remedy that may have been granted by appeal.

00453
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ORDER
Having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, THEREFORE, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant's Motion to Correct an
Illegal Sentence is DENIED.

Dated the jL_ day o f N e i S i c r 7 l 9 9 4

Judge, Third District Court
Approved as to form:

ROBERT L. BOOKER
Counsel for defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Robert L. Booker, Attorney for Defendant, by
mailing a copy to 349 South Second East, Suite 550, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this HjrDsv of
November, 1994.
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